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Abstract
Introduction
Despite strong evidence that increasing alcohol taxes reduces alco-
hol-related harm, state alcohol taxes have declined in real terms
during the past 3 decades. Opponents of tax increases argue that
they are unfair to “responsible” drinkers and those who are finan-
cially disadvantaged. The objectives of this study were to assess
the impact of hypothetical state alcohol tax increases on the cost of
alcohol for adults in the United States on the basis of alcohol con-
sumption and sociodemographic characteristics.
Methods
The increased net cost of alcohol (ie,  product plus tax) from a
series of hypothetical state alcohol tax increases was modeled for
all 50 states using data from the 2011 Behavioral Risk Factor Sur-
veillance System, IMPACT Databank, and the Alcohol Policy In-
formation System. Costs were assessed by drinking pattern (ex-
cessive vs nonexcessive) and by sociodemographic characteristics.
Results
Among states, excessive drinkers would pay 4.8 to 6.8 times as
much as nonexcessive drinkers on a per capita basis and would
pay at least 72% of aggregate costs. For nonexcessive drinkers, the
annual cost from even the largest hypothetical tax increase ($0.25
per drink) would average less than $10.00. Drinkers with higher
household incomes and non-Hispanic white drinkers would pay
higher per capita costs than people with lower incomes and racial/
ethnic minorities.
Conclusion
State-specific tax increases would cost more for excessive drink-
ers, those with higher incomes, and non-Hispanic whites. Costs to
nonexcessive drinkers would be modest. Findings are relevant to
developing evidence-based public health practice for a leading
preventable cause of death.
Introduction
Excessive alcohol consumption is the fourth leading preventable
cause of death in the United States, where it is responsible for ap-
proximately 88,000 deaths annually, nearly 70% of which involve
adults aged 20 to 64 years (1,2). Excessive alcohol consumption is
also a risk factor for unintentional injuries, violence, liver disease,
stroke, dementia, hypertension, several types of cancer, sexual as-
sault, fetal alcohol spectrum disorders, and alcohol use disorders
(3,4). In addition, excessive alcohol use cost the United States
$249 billion in 2010, or approximately $2.05 per drink, and about
$2.00 of every $5.00 were paid by government (5).
Although alcohol taxes have been used to raise revenue, part of
their historical justification has also been their public health bene-
fit (6). Among alcohol policy interventions, evidence of effective-
ness  in  reducing  excessive  drinking  and  related  harms  is  the
strongest, most complete, and consistent for raising alcohol taxes
(7). Meta-analyses find that higher alcohol taxes reduce excessive
drinking as well as alcohol-related injuries, diseases, and death
(8,9).  Increasing  alcohol  taxes  is  recommended  by  the  Com-
munity Preventive Services Task Force to reduce excessive alco-
hol use and related harms (10).
Although some states apply value-based alcohol taxes (ie, taxes
based on a percentage of price) (11), all 50 states levy volume-
based excise taxes (ie, taxes based on a fixed dollar amount per
unit volume) as their principal form of taxation. Because excise
taxes are not based on a percentage of the price of alcohol, infla-
tion erodes their value unless they are increased. As of 2009, the
average state beer tax had declined by approximately 70% in “real
dollar” (ie, inflation-adjusted) terms since 1970, and the inflation-
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adjusted federal beer tax had declined by approximately 40% since
its last increase in 1991 (12). In addition, current alcohol taxes do
not cover alcohol-related costs. In 2006, the combined federal and
state taxes on alcoholic beverages were approximately $0.12 per
drink, while the median cost to state governments (in the form of
health care expenditures, criminal justice system costs, etc.) was
$0.78 per drink (13,14).
Despite their effectiveness and potential to generate government
revenue to offset costs, increased taxes encounter robust political
opposition. Principal concerns raised by opponents of alcohol tax
increases are that 1) alcohol taxes are unfair to ”responsible” (ie,
nonexcessive) drinkers; and 2) the cost of alcohol tax increases are
disproportionately paid by those who are economically disadvant-
aged (15–17). Although it is true that alcohol taxes are not applied
differentially based on a consumer’s drinking pattern or income,
over 90% of adult excessive drinkers binge drink (consume ≥4
drinks per occasion for women, and ≥5 drinks per occasion for
men), over half of the alcohol consumed by US adults is in the
form of drinking binges, and the prevalence of alcohol consump-
tion and binge drinking increases with household income (18,19).
These facts suggest that the counterarguments may be invalid.
Because these counterarguments have not been empirically ad-
dressed  at  the  state  level,  and  because  they  are  an  important
obstacle to maintaining or increasing state alcohol taxes, the ob-
jective of this study was to assess the impact of a series of hypo-
thetical  state alcohol tax increases on the total  cost  of alcohol
(product plus tax) to adults in all 50 US states on the basis of alco-
hol consumption and sociodemographic characteristics. Informa-
tion from this study is important for state policy makers and cit-
izens and to inform evidence-based public health practice for treat-
ing a leading preventable cause of death in the United States.
Methods
State-specific data on alcohol consumption were obtained from the
2011 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). A de-
tailed overview of the BRFSS, including survey methods and in-
formation on data weighting, is available at www.cdc.gov/brfss/
and www.cdc.gov/brfss/technical_infodata/quality.htm. In brief,
the BRFSS is a state-based random–digit-dial telephone survey of
people aged 18 years or older that is conducted monthly in all
states, the District of Columbia (DC), and 3 territories and co-
ordinated  by  the  Centers  for  Disease  Control  and  Prevention
(CDC). The BRFSS core alcohol questions (ie, questions asked of
all drinkers in all states) were used to assess drinking frequency,
average number of drinks consumed during drinking days, binge
drinking  frequency,  and  binge  drinking  intensity  (ie,  average
largest number of drinks consumed on any occasion) within the
past 30 days among US adults aged 18 or older. Weighted data
from the 50 US states and Washington,  DC, were used in this
study.
Excessive drinking was defıned as binge drinking, heavy drinking,
or any alcohol consumption by respondents aged 18 to 20 years of
age (ie,  adults  under  the  minimum legal  drinking age).  Binge
drinking was defined as consuming 5 or more drinks for men or 4
or more drinks for women on 1 occasion or more (20).  Heavy
drinking was defined as consuming an average of more than 2
drinks per day for men or more than 1 drink per day for women.
Average daily alcohol consumption was calculated by multiplying
the number of drinking days in the past 30 days by the usual num-
ber of drinks consumed during drinking days and then dividing by
30 (21). Nonexcessive drinkers were those who consumed alcohol
in the past 30 days but were not classified as excessive drinkers.
The net cost of alcohol tax increases was calculated on the basis of
change in the retail price of alcohol that would be expected to oc-
cur following a hypothetical tax increase. Because state-specific
data about alcohol prices do not exist, we used national data from
IMPACT Databank (22), which reports the average on- and off-
premises price for beer, wine, and spirits, respectively. The aver-
age price of a standard drink in all 50 states and Washington, DC,
was calculated by using beverage-specific price data from IM-
PACT Databank, weighted by state-specific data on beverage-
specifıc per capita alcohol consumption using data from the Alco-
hol Epidemiologic Data System (http://www.healthindicators.gov/
Resources/DataSources/AEDS_172/Profile). Our model assumed
that 75% of the alcohol sold in the United States is purchased in
off-premises establishments (eg, liquor stores, grocery stores, and
other retail locations) (23–25). This assumption enabled us to cal-
culate weighted cost per drink in each state.
The state-specific tax-per-drink was calculated by combining all
state taxes (ie, excise, ad valorem, and sales taxes) for beer, wine,
and spirits to determine a weighted average of state taxes paid per
drink (26). State-specific tax rates for 2011 were obtained from the
Alcohol Policy Information System, administered by the National
Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (11). Among states
with monopolies on wholesaling or retailing (or both) of spirits or
wine (“control states”), there are no data about effective tax rates
on  monopolized  beverages  because  states  apply  a  series  of
markups on the retail price of the controlled beverage(s), and in
some cases, the markup procedures are not transparent. However,
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in states with exclusively private retailing of spirits or wine (“non-
control states”), there is a strong correlation between the taxes
paid for a drink of beer and the average tax paid for a drink of any
type (26). Using these correlation data and beer tax data from con-
trol states, we built a linear regression model to interpolate the av-
erage tax for monopolized beverages in control states.
The total cost per drink was calculated by summing the average
price and average tax per drink in each state. Once the cost per
drink was established, a revised cost per drink (product plus tax)
was calculated for each of the series of hypothetical tax increases.
The expected reduction in alcohol consumption following tax-re-
lated price increases was calculated by using beverage-specific es-
timates of price elasticity from a recent meta-analysis (8). Assum-
ing a 100% pass-through of the tax to the price paid by consumers,
we calculated the expected decreases in consumption for tax in-
creases of $0.05, $0.10, and $0.25 per drink, and following a 5%
increase in the retail price of a drink. After factoring in the impact
of the price increase on average daily consumption, annual alco-
hol consumption was calculated by multiplying the average num-
ber of drinks per day by 365. The net cost of the hypothetical alco-
hol tax increase for individuals was then calculated by subtracting
current annual expenditures from the total annual expenditures an-
ticipated after each of the hypothetical tax increases. Per capita
and aggregate net cost increases were then assessed among sub-
groups on the basis of alcohol consumption patterns (excessive,
nonexcessive, nondrinkers), annual household income (<$25,000,
$25,000–<$50,000, $50,000–<$75,000, ≥$75,000), employment
status (employed for wages, nonemployed [ie, unemployed, self-
employed,  homemakers,  students,  people who are retired,  and
people who are unable to work]), and race/ethnicity (non-Hispan-
ic white, other).
Results
In 2011, 55.1% of US adults reported drinking in the past 30 days.
Overall,  33.6% of US adults (60.9% of current drinkers) were
classified  as  nonexcessive  drinkers,  and  21.5%  of  US  adults
(39.1% of current drinkers) were classified as excessive drinkers
(Table 1). Table 1 also illustrates the characteristics of nonexcess-
ive and excessive drinkers in terms of sociodemographic factors
and the  baseline  number  of  drinks  consumed annually  among
those groups. Among nonexcessive drinkers, for example, those
with the highest incomes and non-Hispanic whites constituted the
largest  proportion  of  the  population  and  also  consumed more
drinks annually on average.
Among all adults in US states, excessive drinkers would pay about
5 times as much in additional net per capita costs (product plus
tax)  as  nonexcessive  drinkers  for  hypothetical  alcohol  tax  in-
creases, and nonexcessive drinkers would pay less than $10 annu-
ally for the largest ($0.25 per drink) tax increase (Table 2). For ex-
ample, a $0.05 per drink tax increase would increase the state av-
erage annual cost of alcohol by $12.56 for excessive drinkers com-
pared with $2.32 for nonexcessive drinkers, and a $0.25 per drink
tax increase (the largest increase) would increase the average an-
nual cost of alcohol by $49.49 for excessive drinkers compared
with $9.15 for nonexcessive drinkers.
By sociodemographic characteristics,  average per  capita  costs
among  US  adults  (including  nondrinkers)  from tax  increases
would be higher among people with higher incomes, employed
people, and non-Hispanic whites (Table 2). For example, after a
tax increase of $0.25 per drink, people earning less than $25,000
would pay an average additional cost of $11.64 per year, while
those earning $75,000 or more would pay an additional $16.98 per
year.  Similarly,  following this  same hypothetical  tax increase,
those who are employed would pay more on average than nonem-
ployed people ($16.15 vs $10.35 annually),  and non-Hispanic
whites would pay more on average than people of other racial/eth-
nic groups ($14.75 vs $10.96).
Among current  drinkers,  stratified  by  drinking  group  and  so-
ciodemographic characteristics (Table 3), nonexcessive drinkers
would pay little in increased per capita costs; for example, the
highest average per capita annual cost in any stratum of income,
employment, and racial/ethnicity was $10.31 for the largest tax in-
crease ($0.25 per drink). In addition, excessive drinkers would pay
4.8  to  6.8  times  more  in  per  capita  average  annual  costs  than
would nonexcessive drinkers. In terms of aggregate costs, all strata
of nonexcessive drinkers would pay less than 30% of costs com-
pared with their corresponding groups of excessive drinkers, al-
though there are more nonexcessive drinkers than excessive drink-
ers.
By income, per capita costs were lower for those with less income,
and the percentage of aggregate costs paid by nonexcessive drink-
ers as a group was lower among those earning less income (eg,
those earning <$25,000 would pay 13.8% of the aggregate costs,
while those earning $75,000 or more annually would pay 28.5% of
costs) (Table 3). Among nonexcessive drinkers, the average annu-
al  per capita cost  of  tax increases was similar  by employment
status,  but  in  aggregate,  the nonemployed paid only 25.0% of
costs. People from racial/ethnic minorities would also pay less in
annual per capita costs and a lower proportion of aggregate costs
(18.8%,  state  range  16.7%–22.1%)  than  would  non-Hispanic
whites (23.8%, range 20.1%–26.3%). Additional state-specific es-
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timates of the costs from each of the 4 hypothetical tax increases
for nonexcessive and excessive drinkers are available at http://
www.camy.org/action/taxes/taxtool/index.html.
By state, the average annual increase in per capita costs to nonex-
cessive drinkers from even the smallest tax increase ($0.05 per
drink) did not exceed $3.00 (Table 4). Similarly, the increase in
per capita costs from the largest tax increase ($0.25 per drink) did
not exceed $12.00 in any state.  In contrast,  excessive drinkers
would pay from 4.1 (District of Columbia and Tennessee) to 7.6
(Arkansas) times more in average annual per capita costs than
nonexcessive drinkers. Nonexcessive drinkers in Indiana had the
lowest average annual increase in costs, while those in Maine had
the highest average annual increase in costs. The proportion of
total costs paid by nonexcessive drinkers as a group ranged from
16.5% (Hawaii, Utah) to 31.3% (Tennessee).
Discussion
On a per capita basis, nonexcessive drinkers would typically pay
less than $10.00 annually in average net costs for the largest hypo-
thetical state alcohol tax increase ($0.25 per drink) and less than
$2.50 annually for the smallest tax increase ($0.05 per drink). Fur-
thermore,  excessive  drinkers  would pay more  than 5  times  as
much as nonexcessive drinkers in per capita increased costs. As a
group, excessive drinkers would also pay approximately three-
quarters of the aggregate costs, even though nonexcessive drink-
ers outnumber excessive drinkers.
Because  excessive  drinkers  account  for  most  alcohol-related
harms in the United States (5),  their  increased cost  relative to
nonexcessive drinkers appears justifiable. That excessive drinkers
would pay most  of  the increased cost  for  state  alcohol  tax in-
creases is not surprising and reflects the skewed distribution of al-
cohol consumption in the United States. More than half of the al-
cohol consumed by US adults is in the form of binge drinks, and
binge drinkers were responsible for about three-quarters of the
$249 billion in economic costs due to excessive drinking in the
United States in 2010 (5).
Members of low-income households and racial/ethnic minorities,
including those who are nonexcessive drinkers, would also pay
less in per capita and aggregate costs following tax increases com-
pared with non-Hispanic whites or those with higher incomes.
These findings contradict the belief that those who are economic-
ally disadvantaged would bear most of the costs from alcohol tax
increases.
The finding that the cost of state alcohol tax increases would be
similar for excessive drinkers in lower and higher income groups
is consistent with the results of other studies (27). However, in-
creasing the price of alcohol might be a particularly effective way
to reduce the risk of alcohol-related harms in low-income popula-
tions. Binge drinking intensity (the number of drinks consumed
during a binge drinking episode) is  higher among low-income
groups compared with high-income groups (19), and proportion-
ate reductions in consumption among those consuming on the
“steep” portion of the risk curve would yield larger reductions in
risk relative to those who drink less.
This research has limitations. First, because there are no adequate
state-specific estimates of alcohol prices in the United States, na-
tional estimates of prices were added to state-specific taxes to es-
timate state prices for alcohol. Therefore, we may have overestim-
ated the increase in net costs to drinkers in states with alcohol
prices that are below the national estimates, because these states
would have both a lower pre-tax price on alcohol and experienced
a greater reduction in consumption due to higher percentage in-
creases in post-tax retail prices. Second, we used beverage-specif-
ic price elasticities from a meta-analysis (8). Price elasticities may
vary on the basis of many factors (age, income, drinking pattern);
however, across the literature, estimates are inconsistent and there
has been no systematic review or meta-analysis of tax elasticities
on the basis of these factors. Were the price elasticity for alcohol
more negative for nonexcessive drinkers compared with excessive
drinkers, excessive drinkers would have paid more in per capita
and aggregate costs from alcohol tax increases because their drink-
ing would have been relatively less affected by price increases.
Similarly, were the price elasticity more negative for low-income
persons, high-income persons would have paid relatively more in
cost increases. Third, it is possible that those who drink more may
purchase cheaper alcohol, so that a given excise tax increase may
represent a greater percentage increase in cost and a larger de-
crease in consumption compared with those who drink less when
price elasticity is applied (6).
Surveys based on self-report are subject to nonresponse bias, and
alcohol consumption may be underreported among respondents
(28). Therefore, our cost estimates are likely to be conservative,
particularly for excessive drinkers who are particularly prone to
underreporting their consumption and who may also be less likely
to participate in surveys or other alcohol studies (29,30). Because
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this was a study of the change in the total cost of alcohol (product
plus tax) due to tax increases, it is important to note that total cost
increases are less than the amount paid in additional taxes because
total costs are offset by the fact that consumers would purchase
less alcohol in response to increased prices. However, reporting
net cost is preferable because it represents the “bottom line” in
terms of how much more consumers would pay for alcohol from
tax increases.
Although many evidence-based strategies exist for reducing ex-
cessive alcohol use, a recent study found that a few policies that
affect the price and availability of alcoholic beverages, including
higher alcohol taxes and controls on alcohol outlet density, have
the greatest impact on binge drinking among US adults (31). Rais-
ing alcohol taxes could also reduce the gap between alcohol-re-
lated costs incurred by state governments versus the revenues de-
rived from state alcohol taxes.
State-specific tax increases would cost more for excessive drink-
ers, those with higher incomes, and non-Hispanic whites. Costs to
nonexcessive drinkers would be modest. This study may be help-
ful in educating policy makers and the public about the distribu-
tion of costs from state alcohol tax increases and can inform de-
bate about the promulgation of evidence-based public health prac-
tices to reduce a leading preventable cause of death and social
problems in the United States.
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Tables
Table 1. Population Distributions and Mean Number of Drinks Consumed at Baseline, by Drinking Status and Sociodemographic Characteristics,
US Adults Aged ≥18 Years, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2011
Sociodemographic
Characteristics
Nonexcessive Drinkersa (n =
73,480,718) Excessive Drinkersb (n = 47,200,442)
Nondrinkersc (n =
98,262,571)
Population
Proportion, %
Mean No. of
Drinks Per Year Population Proportion, % Mean No. of Drinks Per Year Population Proportion, %
All respondents 100 128.0 100 689.1 100
Annual household income, $
<25,000 19.5 102.1 23.8 689.5 41.0
25,000–<50,000 25.3 124.6 25.1 722.1 27.3
50,000–<75,000 18.4 128.7 16.9 678.6 13.3
≥75,000 37.0 144.5 34.1 689.4 18.4
Employment statusd
Employed 57.3 125.9 66.5 696.3 44.6
Nonemployed 42.7 131.6 33.5 674.0 55.4
Race/ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white 87.8 133.4 85.3 703.8 73.4
Othere 12.2 105.8 14.7 632.8 26.6
a Nonexcessive drinkers (33.6% of population, 60.9% of drinkers) were defined as respondents who consumed alcohol during the past 30 days but did not binge
drink (≥5 drinks for men or ≥4 drinks for women on at least one occasion), was not categorized as a heavy drinker (daily average of >2 drinks for men or >1 drink
for women [ie, >60 drinks per month for men or >30 drinks per month for women]), and aged 21 years or older.
b Excessive drinkers (21.5% of population, 39.1% of drinkers) were defined as respondents who during the past 30 days either engaged in binge drinking (≥5
drinks for men or ≥4 drinks for women on at least one occasion), was categorized as a heavy drinker (daily average of >2 drinks for men or >1 drink for women [ie,
>60 drinks per month for men or >30 drinks per month for women]), or aged 18–20 years and reported drinking any alcohol.
c Nondrinkers were 44.9% of the population.
d Employment for wages was self-reported. Those who were nonemployed were unemployed, self-employed, homemakers, students, retired, or unable to work.
e “Other” racial/ethnic categories were non-Hispanic black, Hispanic white, Asian, or other race/ethnicity.
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Table 2. Average Annual Per Capita Costa of 4 Alcohol Tax Increases, by Drinking Status, Income, Employment Status, and Race/Ethnicity, US
Adults Aged ≥18 Years,b Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2011
Characteristics
Mean Annual Per Capita Net Cost in US $ (state minimum, state maximum)
$0.05 per drink increase $0.10 per drink increase $0.25 per drink increase 5% increase in drink price
Alcohol consumption
Excessivec 12.56 (10.42–6.39) 23.79 (19.69–31.13) 49.49 (40.67–65.42) 19.38 (18.37–25.58)
Nonexcessived 2.32 (1.98–2.96) 4.40 (3.75–5.64) 9.15 (7.7–12.00) 3.59 (2.97–4.91)
Nondrinker NA NA NA NA
Household income, $
<25,000 2.95 (0.97–4.64) 5.59 (1.86–8.81) 11.64 (3.95–18.39) 4.55 (1.58–7.21)
25,000–<50,000 3.48 (2.19–4.69) 6.60 (4.17–8.89) 13.74 (8.78–18.48) 5.37 (3.11–6.80)
50,000–<75,000 3.60 (3.52–5.31) 6.83 (6.69–9.99) 14.19 (14.09–20.20) 5.55 (5.37–8.29)
≥75,000 4.31 (3.44–5.28) 8.16 (6.50–9.98) 16.98 (13.39–20.61) 6.68 (5.16–9.31)
Employment status
Employed for wagese 4.10 (2.70–5.01) 7.77 (5.12–9.43) 16.15 (10.58–19.12) 6.33 (4.10–7.34)
Unemployedf 2.62 (1.15–4.17) 4.97 (2.20–7.91) 10.35 (4.66–16.51) 4.05 (1.86–6.48)
Race/ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white 3.75 (2.50–4.37) 7.10 (4.73–8.55) 14.75 (9.83–17.77) 5.77 (3.8–6.86)
Otherg 2.77 (1.97–3.33) 5.26 (3.75–6.33) 10.96 (7.82–13.20) 4.31 (3.07–5.19)
Abbreviation: NA, not applicable.
a The net cost is the change in the amount a person would spend on alcohol (product plus tax) as a result of a hypothetical tax increase. This table includes all US
adults, so average per capita costs are calculated by dividing costs among drinkers and nondrinkers in each group.
b All US adults, including nondrinkers.
c An excessive drinker was defined as a respondent who during the past 30 days either engaged in binge drinking (≥5 drinks for men or ≥4 drinks for women on at
least one occasion), was categorized as a heavy drinker (daily average of >2 drinks for men or >1 drink for women, [ie, >60 drinks per month for men or >30 drinks
per month for women]), or who was aged 18–20 years and reported drinking any alcohol.
d A nonexcessive drinker was defined as a respondent who consumed alcohol during the past 30 days but did not binge drink (≥5 drinks for men or ≥4 drinks for
women on at least one occasion), was not categorized as a heavy drinker (daily average of >2 drinks for men or >1 drinks for women, [ie, >60 drinks per month for
men or >30 drinks per month for women]), and who was aged 21 years or older.
e Self-reported.
f Self-reported; includes self-employed, unemployed, homemaker, student, retired, or unable to work.
g Other race/ethnicity includes non-Hispanic black, Hispanic white, Asian, and other racial/ethnic group.
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Table 3. Average Annual Per Capita Net Costa for Nonexcessive Drinkers,b by Sociodemographic Factors, Excessivec Drinker: Nonexcessive
Drinker Per Capita Cost Ratio, and Proportion of Total Costs Paid by Nonexcessive Drinkers, US Adults Aged ≥18 Years, Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System, 2011
Sociodemographic
characteristics
Mean Annual Per Capita Net Cost From Alcohol Tax Increases for
Nonexcessive Drinkers (State Minimum, State Maximum) Excessive Drinker:
Nonexcessive Drinker Per
Capita Cost Ratio (State
Range)
Percentage of Aggregate
Costs Paid by
Nonexcessive Drinkers
(State Range)
$0.05 Per
Drink Increase
$0.10 Per
Drink Increase
$0.25 Per
Drink Increase
5% Increase in
Drink Price
Annual household income, $
<25,000 1.86
(1.37–2.51)
3.52
(2.57–4.76)
7.33
(5.14–10.02)
2.87
(2.01–3.94)
6.8 (5.1–8.2) 13.8 (11.2–16.3)
25,000–<50,000 2.26
(1.70–3.36)
4.28
(3.23–6.40)
8.90
(6.74–13.55)
3.49
(2.60–5.43)
5.8 (4.4–7.0) 21.1 (15.2–25.2)
50,000–<75,000 2.33
(1.83–2.98)
4.43
(3.47–5.68)
9.20
(7.23–12.08)
3.61
(2.79–4.94)
5.3 (4.1–6.7) 26.2 (21.2–30.1)
≥75,000 2.61
(2.13–3.46)
4.96
(4.01–6.60)
10.31
(8.22–14.03)
4.06
(3.09–5.74)
4.8 (3.9–6.4) 28.5 (23.4–34.2)
Employment status
Employedd 2.28
(1.96–2.83)
4.33
(3.70–5.39)
9.00
(7.63–11.46)
3.53
(2.92–4.69)
5.6 (4.5–7.1) 21.2 (17.2–24.5)
Nonemployede 2.39
(2.00–3.28)
4.53
(3.78–6.25)
9.42
(7.78–13.28)
3.70
(2.88–5.43)
5.1 (4.1–6.4) 25.0 (21.2–29.4)
Race/ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic 2.48
(2.01–3.32)
4.70
(3.85–6.34)
9.76
(7.94–13.35)
3.83
(2.97–5.57)
5.4 (4.2–6.7) 23.8 (20.1–26.3)
Otherf 1.88
(1.38–2.53)
3.57
(2.63–4.88)
7.44
(5.22–10.09)
2.93
(2.09–4.02)
5.9 (4.5–7.0) 18.8 (16.7–22.1)
a The net cost is the change in the amount of money a person would spend on alcohol (product plus tax) as a result of hypothetical tax increases.
b A nonexcessive drinker is defined as a respondent who consumed alcohol during the past 30 days but within those 30 days did not binge drink (≥5 drinks for men
or ≥4 drinks for women on at least one occasion), was not categorized as a heavy drinker (daily average of >2 drinks for men or >1 drink for women [ie, >60 drinks
per month for men or >30 drinks per month for women]), and who was aged 21 or older.
c An excessive drinker is defined as respondent who during the past 30 days either engaged in binge drinking (≥5 drinks for men or ≥4 drinks for women during at
least one occasion) or was categorized as a heavy drinker (daily average of >2 drinks for men or >1 drink for women [ie, >60 drinks per month for men or >30
drinks per month for women]), or who was aged 18–20 and reported drinking any alcohol.
d Self-reported.
e Nonemployed includes self-employed, unemployed, homemaker, student, retired, or unable to work.
f Other race/ethnicity includes non-Hispanic black, Hispanic white, Asian, and other racial/ethnic group.
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Table 4. State-Specific Average Annual Per Capita Net Costa for Nonexcessive Drinkersb, Excessive Drinkerc: Nonexcessive Drinker Per Capita
Cost Ratio, and Proportion of Total Costs Paid by Nonexcessive Drinkers, US Adults Aged ≥18 Years, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System,
2011
State
Mean Annual Per Capita Net Cost ($) From Tax
Increases for Nonexcessive Drinkers
Excessive Drinker:
Nonexcessive Drinker Per
Capita Cost Ratio
Percentage of Aggregate Costs
Paid by Nonexcessive Drinkers
$0.05 Per
Drink
$0.10 Per
Drink
$0.25 Per
Drink
5% of Drink
Price
Alabama 2.39 4.54 9.56 3.65 5.8 19.8
Alaska 2.44 4.61 9.39 3.77 5.5 21.7
Arizona 2.36 4.47 9.27 3.61 4.7 24.6
Arkansas 2.15 4.08 8.58 3.36 7.6 17.0
California 2.22 4.22 8.81 3.59 5.2 22.8
Colorado 2.38 4.47 9.06 3.52 4.6 27.9
Connecticut 2.34 4.41 9.06 3.79 4.8 29.1
Delaware 2.20 4.13 8.25 3.23 5.6 20.3
District of Columbia 2.53 4.78 9.86 4.45 4.1 24.3
Florida 2.31 4.36 9.03 3.65 5.6 23.9
Georgia 2.32 4.39 9.10 3.48 6.0 20.7
Hawaii 2.44 4.64 9.70 3.83 5.8 16.5
Idaho 2.35 4.46 9.37 3.90 5.2 23.4
Illinois 2.22 4.21 8.79 3.45 6.2 17.7
Indiana 1.98 3.75 7.71 2.97 5.8 20.9
Iowa 2.22 4.21 8.75 3.22 6.3 18.1
Kansas 2.25 4.26 8.89 3.40 5.6 22.7
Kentucky 2.12 4.03 8.40 3.25 6.4 16.7
Louisiana 2.16 4.09 8.42 3.12 6.4 18.3
Maine 2.68 5.08 10.53 4.15 4.9 27.8
Maryland 2.18 4.11 8.34 3.34 5.2 25.2
Massachusetts 2.55 4.82 9.89 3.99 4.8 26.6
Michigan 2.27 4.28 8.79 3.43 5.6 21.1
Minnesota 2.28 4.30 8.83 3.59 5.2 22.1
Mississippi 2.15 4.08 8.51 3.15 6.2 19.3
Missouri 2.16 4.08 8.36 3.14 6.0 18.8
Montana 2.63 4.97 10.21 3.73 5.0 22.5
Nebraska 2.26 4.29 8.95 3.27 5.6 19.9
Nevada 2.33 4.41 9.11 3.62 5.7 22.0
New Hampshire 2.57 4.83 9.76 4.00 5.4 26.8
a The net cost is defined as the change in the amount of money a person would spend on alcohol (product plus tax) as a result of hypothetical tax increases.
b A nonexcessive drinker was defined as a respondent who consumed alcohol during the past 30 days but within those 30 days did not binge drink (≥5 drinks for
men or ≥4 drinks for women on at least one occasion), was not categorized as a heavy drinker (daily average of ≥2 drinks for men or ≥1 drink for women [ie, ≥60
drinks per month for men or ≥30 drinks per month for women]), and who was 21 years of age or older.
c An excessive drinker is defined as a respondent who during the past 30 days either engaged in binge drinking (≥5 drinks for men or ≥4 drinks for women during
at least one occasion) or was categorized as a heavy drinker (daily average of ≥2 drinks for men or ≥1 drinks for women [ie, ≥60 drinks per month for men or ≥30
drinks per month for women]), or who was 18 to 20 years of age and reported any alcohol consumption.
(continued on next page)
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(continued)
Table 4. State-Specific Average Annual Per Capita Net Costa for Nonexcessive Drinkersb, Excessive Drinkerc: Nonexcessive Drinker Per Capita
Cost Ratio, and Proportion of Total Costs Paid by Nonexcessive Drinkers, US Adults Aged ≥18 Years, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System,
2011
State
Mean Annual Per Capita Net Cost ($) From Tax
Increases for Nonexcessive Drinkers
Excessive Drinker:
Nonexcessive Drinker Per
Capita Cost Ratio
Percentage of Aggregate Costs
Paid by Nonexcessive Drinkers
$0.05 Per
Drink
$0.10 Per
Drink
$0.25 Per
Drink
5% of Drink
Price
New Jersey 2.17 4.10 8.43 3.53 5.2 26.8
New Mexico 2.49 4.73 9.85 3.74 5.2 24.9
New York 2.27 4.29 8.83 3.53 4.9 25.1
North Carolina 2.55 4.84 10.16 3.97 5.1 23.7
North Dakota 2.05 3.86 7.89 3.01 5.4 19.9
Ohio 2.38 4.53 9.57 3.50 5.7 20.3
Oklahoma 2.02 3.84 8.11 3.14 6.4 17.9
Oregon 2.48 4.67 9.54 3.59 5.1 27.7
Pennsylvania 2.39 4.53 9.47 3.47 5.4 23.6
Rhode Island 2.33 4.41 9.07 3.70 4.6 26.2
South Carolina 2.42 4.59 9.58 3.67 5.9 20.8
South Dakota 2.19 4.14 8.52 3.15 5.1 21.5
Tennessee 2.70 5.15 10.91 4.37 4.1 31.3
Texas 2.38 4.53 9.67 3.75 5.9 20.0
Utah 2.33 4.40 9.10 3.53 5.7 16.5
Vermont 2.96 5.64 12.00 4.91 4.5 30.1
Virginia 2.64 5.00 10.47 4.06 5.0 25.7
Washington 2.58 4.89 10.25 4.20 4.3 29.5
West Virginia 2.38 4.52 9.51 3.37 6.8 19.7
Wisconsin 2.35 4.42 8.97 3.44 5.1 20.9
Wyoming 2.37 4.45 8.96 3.37 5.7 20.8
a The net cost is defined as the change in the amount of money a person would spend on alcohol (product plus tax) as a result of hypothetical tax increases.
b A nonexcessive drinker was defined as a respondent who consumed alcohol during the past 30 days but within those 30 days did not binge drink (≥5 drinks for
men or ≥4 drinks for women on at least one occasion), was not categorized as a heavy drinker (daily average of ≥2 drinks for men or ≥1 drink for women [ie, ≥60
drinks per month for men or ≥30 drinks per month for women]), and who was 21 years of age or older.
c An excessive drinker is defined as a respondent who during the past 30 days either engaged in binge drinking (≥5 drinks for men or ≥4 drinks for women during
at least one occasion) or was categorized as a heavy drinker (daily average of ≥2 drinks for men or ≥1 drinks for women [ie, ≥60 drinks per month for men or ≥30
drinks per month for women]), or who was 18 to 20 years of age and reported any alcohol consumption.
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